Residential Development and Hierarchical Governance: Multifamily Housing and Multilevel Analysis by Park, Sang-Chul et al.
Residential Development and Hierarchical Governance: 
Multifamily Housing and Multilevel Analysis
Sang-Chul Park,* Chang Gyu Kwak,** and Sung-Wook Kwon***
Abstract: This study investigates factors that influence multifamily housing
zoning from a hierarchical governance perspective. Local zoning is a product of
interactive processes among various stakeholders and of local politics. Since
local zoning represents community interests in land development and has an
exclusionary characteristic, multifamily housing zoning is controversial in some
localities. We hypothesize that a hierarchical governance structure influences 
the supply of local multifamily housing zoning. The result of a hierarchical 
generalized linear model shows evidence that state smart growth reform and
state intervention in local land use are positively associated with the establishment
of local multifamily housing zoning. The decisions are also affected by local
factors such as the supply of land, density restrictions, cost of new infrastructure,
and city budget constraints. This study concludes that state authority and smart
growth reform make it possible for local governments to commit to multifamily
housing zoning to achieve housing affordability and high-density development.
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Zoning is regarded as a tool for land use regulation and is defined as a municipality’s
right to govern land in its jurisdiction. Zoning processes have a political nature, and
zoning is understood as the product of interaction among various stakeholders who
have different preferences and incentives for land use development. Furthermore,
since a zoning decision results in winners and losers who reap its benefits and pay its
costs, many studies acknowledge that certain local contextual factors influence local
zoning regulation and residential development. These contextual factors include local
politics, interest groups, community demographics, and the physical environment.
Multifamily housing zoning has a complex political nature and is a controversial
issue for local governments. On the one hand, it creates a positive image for local 
governments and is associated with social justice and housing affordability for low-
and moderate-income families as well as deconcentration of poverty (McClure, 2008).
Increasing multifamily housing enables low-income people to live near the workplace
and helps local governments achieve efficient use of public services and infrastructure
(CPR, 2002). Furthermore, by providing multifamily housing, local governments can
create jobs and stimulate local economic development in terms of both immediate and
long-term employment and spending in the local economy (Wardrip, Williams, &
Hague, 2011). Thus, many local governments’ comprehensive plans include land use
policies that are favorable to affordable housing such as inclusionary zoning, a density
bonus, and mixed and compact development that are also fundamentally forms of
environmental preservation (Pendall, 1999).
On the other hand, multifamily housing zoning is negatively perceived due to
potential problems such as high population density, high crime rates, environmental
pollution, and traffic congestion, which decrease housing and land values (Fischel,
2001; Haughey, 2003; Knaap et al., 2007; Obrinsky & Stein, 2007; Park, Feiock, &
Kwon, 2012). Because of this negative perception, multifamily housing zoning faces
opposition from citizens, developers, and even local governmental officials. Thus, it is
difficult to expect high levels of commitment from local government and the community
to multifamily housing zoning.
A hierarchical governance perspective is an influential perspective from which we
can analyze local establishment of multifamily housing zoning as it explains both the
influence of upper-level governments and the commitment of lower-level governments.
According to Fischel (1999) and Park, Feiock, and Kwon (2012), even though zoning
for residential development is established by local government with the power to regulate
land use development patterns, state and federal institutions credibly affect formation
of the local land use planning environment. Moreover, Fischel (1999, p. 407) specifies
that “controlling residential zoning explicitly contain the land use planning environment
of higher level of government, reflecting state- and region-wide interests.”
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This study investigates the influence of both hierarchical governance systems and
local factors on multifamily housing zoning. Previous studies that have examined 
factors influencing land use regulation and residential development have constructed
theoretical and analytical frameworks focusing on a single level of local government
without consideration of dynamics that may function between state and local levels.
According to Bollens (1992), instead of focusing on local growth management policies,
the consolidated roles and rules of state and local governments should be investigated
through diverse intergovernmental frameworks. In particular, he points out that a 
reason for transferring land use authority from local to state government is to solve the
unwillingness and inability of local government to handle growth-related problems
(such as environmental protection, affordable and multifamily housing, and public
facilities). That is, while existing studies have implicitly accepted that multifamily
housing is a local governance issue, this field will be expanded and improved if we
find evidence of multilevel governance. Thus, this study is expected to contribute to
the research by examining the effects of state-level factors on the establishment of
local multifamily housing zoning.
HIERARCHICAL GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE
A key aspect of governance is the collaboration between diverse actors that may
include different levels of government and various stakeholders in public, private, and
nonprofit organizations. Based on the collective action perspective, Emerson, Nabatchi,
and Balogh (2011, p. 2) define governance as “mutually-shared understanding which
determines norms and rules designed to regulate individuals and group behaviors.”
More specifically, it involves coordination and regulation processes that secure policy
commitment in pursuing collaborative actions on certain policies (Bryson, Crosby, &
Stone, 2006).
The perspective of hierarchical governance is elaborated by transaction cost theory.
This theory, originated in Coase’s The Nature of the Firm (1937), states that hierarchy
is regarded as an alternative structure to the market (Williamson, 1975). According to
transaction cost theory, the hierarchical structure can reduce the cost that is consistent
with the uncertainty of mutual agreement and commitment in the managerial decision-
making process.
Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar (2006, p. 519) argue that asset specificity, volume
uncertainty, and behavioral uncertainty are positively correlated with the choice of
hierarchical governance over marketized structure. This may imply that state action is
necessary to reduce local complexity from various conflicts in local policy-making
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processes, which consequently minimizes transaction costs. That is, from the perspec-
tive of intergovernmental relations, state regulatory authority and intervention are able
to reduce the costs of local complexity and conflicts by achieving efficient cooperation
among local governments. Thus, hierarchical rules can resolve commitment problems
through the formal rule structure and shape the agreement between state and local
governments.
The concept of holon (Ostrom, 1990) can help to explain hierarchical governance. It
describes rules as being nested in higher levels of institutions or decisions. This means
that institutions and policy actions cannot be isolated to a single level of government;
rather, multilevel governmental relationships should be considered when we study
decision-making related to a certain policy. This perspective has been frequently cited in
recent research. For example, Tavares et al. (2008) use multilevel analysis to investigate
nested structure in order to explain policy outcomes in which they identify the factors
influencing decision delay in land use decision-making at the municipal level. Likewise,
Park, Feiock, and Kwon (2012) define state governments as the upper-level participants
in local residential development decisions and reveal that the state government authority
reduces conflicts in local decision-making processes.
McCabe and Feiock (2001) focus on the hierarchical governance structure in the
relations between state and local governments. They argue that states’ constitutional
rules and institutions determine local governments’ policy choices and emphasize local
government responsibility for state institutional goals. When externality problems are
caused across jurisdictions or are regional in character, the authority delegated to local
governments will be less efficient when promoting the allocation and redistribution of
policy consequences. Likewise, regarding intergovernmental relations, Turner (1990)
argues that there is a complicated pattern when the policy authority is divided into
states and local governments. Specifically, he argues that the partial delegation of
authority from state to local governments causes more complex decision-making rules
and less discretion due to unclear policy authority. Thus, the policy authority must be
clearly defined by a strong hierarchical structure to achieve mutual adjustment.
SMART GROWTH MANAGEMENT AND MULTIFAMILY HOUSING
Growth management policy is regarded as a regulatory policy through which state
government influences land use policy choices and outcomes of local governments
(Park, Park, & Lee, 2010; Feiock, 1994). Therefore, it is an important mechanism of
hierarchical governance in the area of multifamily housing zoning. This regulatory
policy has been developed with the objective of integrating development interests with
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environmental protection. Carruthers (2002, p. 1962) portrays intergovernmental 
relationships in growth management policies as follows: “(1) vertical consistency is
consistent with state-defined policy objectives, (2) horizontal consistency is related
with local plans, and (3) internal consistency is related to concerns about local plans
interacting with development regulation (e.g., zoning ordinance).” That is, growth
management involves both vertical and horizontal intergovernmental relations, aiming
to integrate state and local government regulations and promote policy consistency
within and between governments while reducing community-wide negative externalities
from excessive urban and suburban development (Park, Park, & Lee, 2010).
Growth-management policy can be seen as developing in two phases. During the
1970s and 1980s, it aimed to control urban growth and preserve the natural environ-
ment (Weitz, 1999). During this period, states regulated urban service boundaries and
region-wide land use development. This early growth management era was more likely
to prevent the urban sprawl that causes expansion of urban boundaries, environmental
pollution, and social segregation. Under this strong growth control, urban development
is characterized by a “doughnut” pattern in which businesses and wealthy residents
migrate to suburban areas and core city areas become hollowed out and populated 
primarily by poor residents.
As a result, second-order sprawl takes place in suburbs that are not within the 
previous urban service boundaries. For example, since many people must commute
from suburban to urban areas, commute time, air pollution, and traffic congestion
become social problems. Furthermore, residential development in suburbs allows
developers to use large lot sizes for single-family houses, which increases housing 
values and results in less housing affordability.
Thus, states redirect the regulatory means of growth management to balance housing
affordability and residential development interests under the presumption of environ-
mental preservation. This second phase of growth management is regarded as smart
growth management, which emphasizes the role of local governments committed to
pursuing comprehensive land-use plans that result in reduced suburban (second-order)
sprawl and development of inner-city areas. Smart growth management encourages
local governments to promote density development that is positively associated with
housing affordability through various policy instruments such as inclusionary zoning,
regional fair-share housing, lower cost of new infrastructure, and minimizing regulation
(Nelson et al., 2002, p. 7).
However, without a state-level growth management policy, the economic function
and exclusionary nature of zoning can be barriers to high-density development and
multifamily housing production. Since zoning determines local land development 
patterns and strongly influences neighborhood property values, multifamily housing
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zoning can be perceived negatively. Also, intergovernmental competition could explain
why local governments may not be willing to provide multifamily housing. Influenced
by competition from other local governments, city governments may concentrate on
economic and land development policies so as to secure governmental resources and
fiscal stability. Focusing on economic development, cities are less likely to promote
multifamily housing, which is regarded as a redistributive policy (Peterson, 1981; 
Fischel, 2001). Thus, local governments are more likely to promote lower-density
development (single-family housing developments or commercial developments)
rather than high-density development (multifamily housing developments and affordable
housing). In this situation, state intervention based on smart growth management can
help local governments improve their accountability by establishing multifamily housing
zoning (Bollens, 1992).
While smart growth management is generally expected to improve high-density
development and housing affordability as mentioned above, its impact on multifamily
housing zoning should receive more attention. In spite of its positive image, multifamily
housing has a strongly negative image for residents as well, which makes multifamily
housing zoning difficult to provide in practice. Thus, the positive relationship between
state smart growth management policy and local multifamily housing zoning may not
be easily observed. Whether smart growth management can achieve its goals in the
complex and controversial issue of multifamily housing has not been answered in 
previous studies and should be addressed through empirical tests.
LOCAL CONTEXTS AND MULTIFAMILY HOUSING
Multifamily housing zoning can be an outcome of the interaction between political
institutions, community, and physical characteristics of local governments. While upper-
level institutions affect the policy choices and outcomes of lower-level institutions,
collective choices go through interactive processes between local politics and community
preferences under the conditions of the physical environment (Ostrom, 2005).
Travares et al. (2008) and Park, Feiock, and Kwon (2012) investigate the effects of
political institutions on the approval time for land use development. These studies 
provide three insights: First, political institutions mediate diverse interests and conflicts
among local stakeholders, and those mediating effects reduce the length of approval or
review time for multifamily housing development. Second, the longer approval time is
needed, the more stringent land use development and regulation are likely to be. Third,
the rezoning for multifamily housing development is more controversial, and the role
of professional groups (such as environmental review groups, planning commissioner,
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and local zoning board) is important in reducing local conflicts with regard to decisions
on multifamily housing development.
While political institutions, particularly city councils, can play a significant role in
decisions on local land use issues, residents’ priorities are also an influential predictor
of the decision-making processes. Persson and Tabellini (2000, p. 20) argue that 
individuals (residents) get involved in policy decision-making processes through
“voting, lobbying or other behaviors influencing local political institutions.” Lubell,
Feiock, and Ramirez (2005) and Yoo and Park (2010) emphasize the importance of
community demographics concentrated on narrow preferences, when local governments
enact land use institutions and regulations governing residential development. That is,
citizen consensus or agreement about multifamily housing zoning is more likely to
influence the site and size of a zone. Thus, opposition from city council and citizens to
multifamily housing is assumed to be negatively related to the extent of multifamily
housing zoning.
Impact fees may have significance for multifamily housing. An impact fee is
defined as a “one-time fee imposed on new development to fund public facility
improvements required by new development and ease fiscal burdens on localities”
(Burge & Ihlanfeldt, 2006; Lawhon, 2007). Local governments can share the costs 
for land development by imposing impact fees on developers. According to previous
studies, real estate developers that prioritize large lot size and low-density development
in single-family housing construction and commercial development can maximize profits
from increased property values (Mathur, Waddell, & Blanco, 2004; Evans-Cowley,
Forgey, & Rutherford, 2005). Thus, the use of impact fees may limit multifamily
housing zoning, since multifamily housing development posits high density and small
lot size development consistent with low property values.
Land development and zoning processes are strongly related to existing land use
patterns and physical conditions. Even though local governments are willing to develop
residential areas, their current physical condition may make it difficult to generate new
residential development. Unless local governments possess land that is available to be
developed, zoning for multifamily housing development cannot be easily achieved.
Likewise, density is regarded as an important factor in land use and zoning permission.
Kang and Feiock (2006) argue that density and land availability are critical factors that
can be used to test the effect of growth context on land use regulation. This is consistent
with Miller’s (1986) finding that housing density regulations are negatively associated
with promotion of housing affordability and multifamily housing construction. Overall,
less land supply and high housing density restrictions will result in less multifamily
housing zoning.
In addition to physical conditions, budget constraints and high costs for new infra-
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structure are considered a burden for local governments in zoning selection. Inconsis-
tency between fiscal constraints and zoning policies has an impact on new infra-
structure development. The burden of cost transfers to developers, taxpayers, and
landowners results in difficulty utilizing residential development (Weitz, 1999). That
is, multifamily housing zoning needs extensive new infrastructure (such as schools,
transportation, water supply and sewers, and public facilities) supported by financial
stability (Nelson et al., 2002). Consequently, the fiscal burden and high costs of new
infrastructure can influence land use zoning and multifamily housing development in a
negative way (Chapman, 1988).
DATA AND METHODS
Data for an empirical analysis were obtained from two sources. City-level data
were drawn from a survey on residential land use regulation conducted by the University
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Table 1. Measurement of Variables
Variable Measurement
State level
Growth management Dummy variable (1 = enacted, 0 = not enacted)
Smart growth management 4-point Likert scale (0 = no reform movement, 3 = substantial 
movement)
Strong state authority * smart growth Strong state authority is a dummy variable (1 = state has 
management authority over local land use, 0 = otherwise)
Authority shared between state and local Shared state authority is a dummy variable (1 = state shares 
government * smart growth management local land use authority with local government, 0 = otherwise)
Local level
Dependent variable:
Supply of multifamily housing zoning in Dummy variable (1 = multifamily housing zoning is more than 
excess of citizen demand demand, 0 = multifamily housing zoning is less than or equal 
to demand)
Independent variables:*
• City council opposition 5-point Likert scale (1 = not important at all; 5 = very 
• Impact fee important)
• Citizen opposition
• Supply of land
• Cost of new infrastructure
• City budget constraints
• Density restriction
* Higher score means city has greater concern.
of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School in 2005. State-level growth management and 
smart growth reform data were retrieved from the website of the American Planning
Association. The Wharton survey was sent to 6,896 municipalities nationwide that
were on the mailing list of the International City/County Management Association.
The respondents were chief administrative officers or planning directors in those
municipalities, and the response rate was 38 percent (Gyourko, Saiz, & Summers,
2007). The appendix shows the Wharton School survey questions that measure the
dependent variable and seven city-level independent variables used in our study.
The dependent and independent variables were collected for the years 2004 and
2005; measures and descriptive statistics for these variables are presented in tables 1
and 2. The unit of analysis in our model is the municipality, while the state factors are
combined into one model. The dependent variable in our model is a dummy variable
that indicates whether or not a municipality has established multifamily housing 
zoning in excess of citizens’ demand for multifamily housing development; this was
true for 17 percent of municipalities.
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max
State level
Growth management 49 0.24 0.43 0 1
Smart growth management 49 1.29 1.06 0 3
Strong state authority * smart growth management 49 0.31 0.92 0 3
Authority shared between state and local government * 
smart growth management 49 0.78 0.96 0 3
Local level
Dependent variable:
Supply of multifamily housing zoning compared to demand 2,410 0.17 0.38 0 1
Independent variables:
City council opposition to growth 2,410 2.37 1.42 1 5
Impact fee 2,410 2.14 1.24 1 5
Citizen opposition to growth 2,410 2.82 1.36 1 5
Supply of land 2,410 3.89 1.38 1 5
Cost of new infrastructure 2,410 3.37 1.30 1 5
City budget constraints 2,410 2.31 1.39 1 5
Density restriction 2,410 3.28 1.40 1 5
The independent variables were collected from two different levels of government.
First, state-level factors were constructed as higher-level predictors in our model.1
These generally fit into three categories: conventional growth management, smart
growth reform, and intergovernmental relations combined with state land use authority
and smart growth management. Table 3 summarizes state laws that promote conven-
tional growth management.
The extent of smart growth reform (table 4) is a summated index by the legislative
activities and specified smart growth planning and policy initiatives related to issues
such as land use, open space conservation, housing affordability, green economic
development, transportation, mixed and high-density development, and coastal preser-
vation. For instance, according to a recent report on planning for smart growth (APA,
2012, pp. 14-20), the extent of smart growth reform is based on indicators such as
polls, legislation, executive orders, budget proposals, and ballot initiatives.
10 Residential Development and Hierarchical Governance
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies
1. The state of Hawaii was excluded because only one city in the state was observed in the
survey. A single observation within a group is not reliable when investigating the effect of
group variability on individual-level outcomes.
Table 3. State Laws Related to Conventional Growth Management
State Year Name of legislation
Hawaii 1961 Hawaii State Land Use Law
California 1965 California Land Conservation Law
Vermont 1970 Growth Management Act
Oregon 1973 Land Conservation and Development Act
Florida 1985 Omnibus Growth Management Act
New Jersey 1986 State Planning Act
Maine 1988 Comprehensive Planning and Land Use Regulation Act
Rhode Island 1988 Comprehensive Planning and Land Use Regulation Act
Georgia 1989 Georgia Planning Act
Washington 1990 Growth Management Act
Maryland 1992 Economic Growth, Resource Protection and Planning Act
Arizona 1998 Growth Smarter Act
Tennessee 1998 Growth Policy Act
Sources: Park et al. (2010, p. 49); Anthony (2004); Howell-Moroney (2008).
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Table 4. State-Level Smart Growth Reform, 2000-2001
State Reform
Governor’s Executive Order
Arizona No. 2001-02, creating the Growing Smarter Oversight Council
California D-46-01, directing state Department of General Services to reuse state buildings in central cities
Delaware No. 14, directing state agencies and departments to implement steps curbing sprawl
Indiana No. 01-03, establishing the Indiana Land Use Forum
Maryland No. 01.01.2001.01, creating the Commission on Environmental Justice and Sustainable Communities
Massachusetts No. 418, creating a two-year Community Development Plan Program
No. 01-16, establishing the Missouri Commission on Intergovernmental Cooperation
Missouri No. 01-19, directing the executive branch to help achieve measurable improvements 
in state’s quality of life
Oregon No. 00-07, to address sustainability issues and establish the Governor’s Work Group on Sustainability
South Carolina No. 2001-09, creating an affordable housing task forceNo. 2001-11, establishing a swine facilities moratorium
Tennessee Executive order to establish Strategically Targeted Areas of Redevelopment
No. 01-00, creating a Development Cabinet
Vermont No. 01-07, fostering conservation of land near interstate highway interchanges and 
discouraging strip-type development along these areas
Commissions and task forces
Alabama Alabama Commission on Environmental Initiatives: report, January 2001
Colorado Governor’s Commission on Saving Open Spaces, Farms and Ranches: 11 proposals, December 2000
Florida Growth Management Study Commission: report, February 2001
Illinois Balanced Growth CabinetIllinois Growth Task Force: series of reports, 2000
Kentucky Bipartisan Task Force on Smart Growth: report, November 2001
New Hampshire Three study commissions to address affordable housing, shoreland protection, and rail transit: reports, November 2001 and January 2002
New York Quality Communities Interagency Task Force: report, January 2001
North Carolina Commission to Address Smart Growth Management and Development Issues: report, November 2001
North Dakota Study to examine use of conservation easements to protect farmland and recreational lands
Growth Planning Council: first annual report, August 2001
Rhode Island Commission to study how state government can encourage sustainability: report, 
January 2002
Vermont Land-use permitting process study commission, affordable housing study commission, and downtown redevelopment task force
Virginia Commission on Growth and Economic Development
Source: APA (2002); http://www.miami21.org/PDFs/Planning%20for%20Smart%20Growth.pdf
Figures 1 and 2 show the strength of smart growth reform and the correlation
between the extent of smart growth reform and conventional growth management for
all states except Hawaii. They show that, among the 49 states, 9 have substantial
movement toward smart growth in statewide policies; 9 have moderate movement; 18
have less moderate movement; and 13 have no substantial movement toward smart
growth. In states that have enacted conventional growth management laws, the extent
of smart growth reform is higher than in those that did not.
For the first and second part of our analysis, two different state-level variables are
used to measure the effects of conventional and smart growth management on local
multifamily housing zoning. We test whether conventional growth management or
smart growth management initiatives affect the extent of multifamily housing zoning
at the local level. The conventional growth management variable is a dummy variable:
if a state enacts growth management, it is coded 1, otherwise 0. The smart growth
management variable is measured by categorical data ranging from 0 to 3, where 
0 indicates no smart growth reform and 3 indicates substantial reform. While both
variables show the level of state growth management efforts, they need to be examined
in separate models as they reflect different contexts in the growth management issue,
as explained above, and may have a different influence on the extent of local multi-
family housing zoning.
For the third section of the analysis, we construct interaction terms in order to test
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Figure 1. State Smart Growth Reform
the effects of intergovernmental relations. Two interaction terms are created by multi-
plying by two variables: the extent of state land use authority and the extent of smart
growth management reform. State land use authority is measured by two dummy 
variables: (1) whether a state has authority over local land use and (2) whether a state
shares its authority with local government. These two variables are then multiplied 
by the level of the state smart growth management variable explained above. Those
interaction term variables are created and tested, focusing on state smart growth 
management effort as it is more directly related to the multifamily housing issue than
conventional growth management is.
Local-level predictors include city council opposition to multifamily housing 
construction, impact fee requirements, citizen opposition, land supply, cost of new
infrastructure, city budget constraints, and density restrictions. The data for these 
variables were obtained from the Wharton School’s survey questions that asked city
officials to evaluate the importance of each in regulating multifamily housing develop-
ment in their communities. The regulating rate for each variable ranges from 1 (not
important at all) to 5 (very important). Thus, if a variable has a higher score, it means
that the city has a stronger concern about the variable’s effect on multifamily housing
development.
To analyze the data, we run a multilevel analysis using HLM software. Before a
multilevel model is analyzed, we conduct a one-way ANOVA analysis in order to find
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Figure 2. Relationship between Smart Growth Reform and Conventional Growth Management
variation among states on the distribution of multifamily housing zoning. The result
reported in table 5 shows that the odds of average supplied multifamily housing 
zoning are about 0.21 across states, which means 17.6 percent of municipalities provide
multifamily housing zoning that is greater than current demand.2 Governmental hier-
archy as an explanation for the extent of multifamily housing zoning is verified by the
statistically significant variance components (p < 0.000).
To test the hierarchical governance structure for 2,410 cities in the 49 states included
in our analysis, we construct five models: an unconditional model, tested by including
only local-level predictors, and four simple random-intercept models (SRIM), which
are conditional with four different state factors based on the unconditional model. The
following equations specify our multilevel models:
Unconditional model
Prob (Supply of Multifamily Housing Zoningij = 1 | βj) = ϕij
log[ϕij/(1-ϕij)] = ηij
ηij = γ00 + γ10 (Council Oppositionij) + γ20 (Impact Feeij) + γ30 (Citizen Oppositionij) 
+ γ40 (Supply of Landij) + γ50 (Infrastructure Costij) + γ60 (City Budgetij) 
+ γ70 (Density Restrictionij) + u00
Simple random intercept model
Prob (Supply of Multifamily Housing Zoningij = 1 | βj) = ϕij
log[ϕij/(1-ϕij)] = ηij
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2. γ00 is the mean of the log (p/1-p). In Table 5, γ00 is -1.545. Based on the equation π/(1–π) =
k = 0.213, π is equal to 17.55. Thus, it is probable that about 17.6 percent of municipalities
across states will supply multifamily housing zoning that exceeds citizen demand.
Table 5. One-Way ANOVA Model Analysis
Fixed effect Coefficient Se T-ratio p-value
Average supply of multifamily housing zoning, γ00 -1.545 0.088 -17.519 0.000
Odds ratio C.I.
0.213 (0.178, 0.255)
Random effect S.D. Variance df χ2 p-valuecomponent
State mean 0.435 0.189 48 103.536 0.000 
ηij = γ00 + γ01 (State Growth Management Factors) + γ10 (Council Oppositionij) 
+ γ20 (Impact Feeij) + γ30 (Citizen Oppositionij) + γ40 (Supply of Landij) 
+ γ50 (Infrastructure Costij) + γ60 (City Budgetij) + γ70 (Density Restrictionij) + u00
where ηij is the predicted value of the municipalities’ characteristics for municipality i
in state j, γ10 through γ70 are the coefficients that represent the effects of municipality-
level variables, γ01 is the coefficient that represents the effect of the state-level variable,
and u00 is a random error in the state-level equation.
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Table 6 shows the results of our hierarchical generalized linear model analysis and
significant factors. The results of the unconditional model show the effects of only
local factors, and the SRIM models compare the effects of state growth management
factors on the extent of multifamily housing zoning. While conventional growth 
management does not show any significant influence on multifamily housing zoning
(Model I), smart growth reform (p<0.05) positively influences the probability that
local governments will establish multifamily housing zoning that exceeds demand
(Model II). Also, the interaction effect (p<0.05) between strong state authority over
local land use and smart growth reform increases the probability that local govern-
ments will establish multifamily housing zoning that exceeds demand (Model III).
However, the interaction effect between shared authority over local land use and smart
growth reform is not statistically significant (Model IV). In sum, we find that local
governments are likely to establish multifamily housing zoning that exceeds citizen
demands when state governments institute substantial smart growth management
reforms or possess strong authority over local land use while instituting smart growth
management reforms.
The results also show that several local factors influence the establishment of local
multifamily housing zoning. Importantly, factors related to physical characteristics show
strong significance in our models. In both the unconditional model and SRIM, supply
of land (p<0.001) and density restrictions (p<0.005) are negatively associated with the
establishment of multifamily housing zoning. This result implies that municipalities
that suffer from insufficient supply of land and have a strong density restriction are
less willing to increase multifamily housing zoning.
However, inconsistent with our hypothetical expectations, when costs of building new
infrastructure (p<0.05) increase and budget constraints are high (p<0.05), municipalities
establish more multifamily housing zoning. While we assumed that local governments’
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incentive to provide multifamily housing would be limited by these burdens, the
results show that local governments tend to pursue small-lot-size development in
urban areas in response to the problems in land use. When their general development
activities are reduced due to the burdens, local governments may focus on multifamily
housing construction by utilizing existing infrastructure in order to save the costs of
purchasing large landed estates and constructing new infrastructure. Other local factors,
such as opposition from city council and citizens and the imposition of animpact fee,
do not affect the local establishment of multifamily housing zoning. In sum, our results
show that existing physical characteristics are the main determinants of the provision
of multifamily housing zoning at the local level.
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Table 6. Results of Analysis of Multifamily Housing Zoning
Fixed effect
Unconditional SRIM (odds ratio)
(odds ratio) Model I Model II Model III Model IV
Intercept γ00 0.650 0.608** 0.529** 0.613* 0.624*
State growth management factor
Growth management, γ01 – 1.329 – – –
Smart growth management, γ01 – – 1.165** – –
State authority and smart growth, γ01 – – – 1.193** –
Shared authority and smart growth, γ01 – – – – 1.048
Local-level factors
City council opposition, γ10 0.937 0.936 0.935 0.937 0.937
Impact fee, γ20 0.978 0.971 0.969 0.976 0.975
Citizen opposition, γ30 0.981 0.980 0.980 0.980 0.980
Supply of land, γ40 0.697*** 0.694*** 0.692*** 0.696*** 0.697***
Cost of new infrastructure, γ50 1.114** 1.120** 1.124** 1.116** 1.116**
City budget constraints, γ60 1.113** 1.118** 1.122** 1.119** 1.115**
Density restriction, γ70 0.940 0.939 0.936** 0.940** 0.939
Random effect Variance Variance Variance Variance Variancecomponent component component component component
State mean, u00 0.089** 0.081** 0.064** 0.070** 0.093**
Note: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
IMPLICATIONS AND DISCUSSION
This study focuses on multifamily housing zoning to test hierarchical governance
between state and local governments. Since zoning is a product of local governments’
efforts to promote their interests regarding land development, and has exclusion as a
characteristic, multifamily housing zoning is controversial in some localities. By
investigating hierarchical governance, this study identifies that strong state intervention
and smart growth reform influence local land use decisions on multifamily housing
and effectively encourage local governments to establish multifamily housing zoning.
State growth management accounts for the role of high-level government, which
affects local governments’ establishment of multifamily housing zoning. Our analysis
shows that the smart growth reform movement is positively associated with multifamily
housing zoning, while conventional growth management is not. Since conventional
growth management is more likely to concentrate on controlling urban growth and
alleviating urban density, it may not encourage multifamily housing zoning in urban
areas. However, smart growth reform essentially aims to develop urban areas through
mixed and compact development, promoting high-density development while enhancing
housing affordability. And the analysis shows that smart growth management helps
local governments establish multifamily housing zoning even though this zoning is
controversial and not in an agreement among residents because of its negative aspects.
Also, when smart growth reform is accompanied by a state’s strong authority over
local land use, more multifamily housing zoning is established than is demanded 
by citizens. Since multifamily housing development is perceived negatively by local
governments and citizens in general, many local governments have avoided it and
have introduced other types of development through which they can increase local
revenues and attract private investment related to economic, commercial, and single-
family housing development.
Thus, state intervention in local land use can be more effective in establishing 
multifamily housing zoning. State intervention attempts to utilize local land through
statewide land use planning objectives in order to prevent locally concentrated interests
in residential development. Further, intervention under smart growth reform can help
local governments pursue inner-city development while resolving housing affordability
and environmental issues.
Among local contextual factors, physical environment is influential in determining
multifamily housing zoning. When local governments have a limited land supply and
must increase density for residential development, more multifamily housing zoning
tends to be established. Since multifamily housing zoning is based on high-density
development, the localities that already have high density may switch their land use
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development patterns toward low-density development. Likewise, local governments
facing a lack of land to utilize for multifamily housing construction, not surprisingly,
cannot produce it. That is, the physical environment can be a key dimension in the
pursuit of multifamily housing zoning.
The construction market and governmental fiscal status can be reasons to promote
multifamily housing zoning. One of the reasons to pursue high-density development 
is to make better use of existing infrastructure. Focusing on density and compact
development in urban areas, local governments can take advantage of well-organized
infrastructure that already exists in urban areas and utilize it for multifamily housing
construction. Similarly, the utilization of existing infrastructure as a means of cost 
savings can be a solution to budget constraints in multifamily housing development. 
In general, when local governments initiate residential development, the cost of new
infrastructure depends on the types and sizes of housing that local governments develop.
When local governments face budget constraints, they may find a way to develop 
multifamily housing using existing infrastructure.
While the physical environment and infrastructure are significant predictors deter-
mining provision of multifamily housing zoning, city council opposition, citizen oppo-
sition, and use of impact fees do not affect it. This may imply that, even though local
politicians and citizens are crucial actors in residential development decision processes,
multifamily housing zoning is more likely to be constrained by physical conditions.
Even when local governments have a strong willingness to establish multifamily housing
zoning, it is difficult to carry out in practice when physical and financial conditions are
not favorable. Likewise, we expected the use of impact fees to be negatively associated
with the establishment of multifamily housing zoning, but such fees actually had little
effect.
In sum, this study has significance in terms of empirical testing of a hierarchical
federal system. Using multifamily housing zoning, it examines the effects of state 
government intervention and the role of smart growth reform. While the effect of state
smart growth reform on local government policy choices has been discussed, few studies
have empirically tested the relationship between higher- and lower-level governments.
This study finds that state intervention can help local governments pursue policies that
have an exclusionary nature, and so are not easily compromised among residents, such
as multifamily housing zoning.
While the purpose of this study was to find evidence of multilevel governance
structure in local multifamily housing zoning, future research should more directly
investigate how state-level factors influence local governments’ zoning decisions.
More importantly, specific measures that show differences between conventional and
smart growth management initiatives should be developed and tested in empirical
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models. Also, case studies can be conducted to analyze the dynamics of these two 
different growth management approaches’ influence on the local multifamily housing
supply.
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APPENDIX: WHARTON SCHOOL SURVEY QUESTION
[Independent variables]
On a scale of 1 to 5, please rate the importance of each of the following factors in
regulating the rate of residential development regarding multifamily units in your
community.
(1 = not at all important; 5 = very important)
• Supply of land
• Cost of new infrastructure
• Density restrictions
• Impact fees
• City budget constraints
• City council opposition
• Citizen opposition
[Dependent variable]
How does the acreage of land zoned for the following land use compare to demand?
(1 = far more than demanded; 5 = far less than demanded)
• Multifamily housing
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